they turn from that discussion to another subject or physically part—then a fresh offer is required. Ahmad expressly stated that if a marriage offer is made to an absent person, and a messenger goes to him and he accepts during the sitting in which the offer is conveyed, the contract is valid. Some of his followers therefore supposed that this constituted a second position of his: that acceptance may be delayed without restriction, even when the parties had been in the same gathering, then separated and allowed a lengthy interval to elapse. This is the position reported in works such as al-Hidāyah, al-Muqni', al-Muharrar, and others: that acceptance in marriage remains valid even after the gathering has ended.

That is mistaken, as my grandfather pointed out—as I recall—in his major work. There is no distinction here between marriage, sale, and lease contracts. The distinction between the two situations is clear, and other jurists, such as Abū Yūsuf and others, also recognize it. This distinction is among the soundest positions. It seems likely that Ahmad’s expressly stated position concerning ablution follows the same distinction, but I have not yet examined his statement on ablution closely. For often two positions are reported from him in such matters, whereas his explicit statements distinguish between different circumstances—and that distinction is correct—as in the questions of giving equivalent values and of killing the testator.

Moreover, continuity is more firmly required in circumambulation and in walking between Safā and Marwah than in ablution. Nevertheless, one may interrupt circumambulation for an obligatory prayer that is commencing or a funeral prayer that is taking place, then resume the circumambulation without starting over. Ablution is therefore all the more deserving of this allowance. Accordingly, if he were to perform ablution after