that this was their practice in numerous cases, with no one known to have objected. Examples include Ibn Masʿūd’s giving charity on behalf of the owner of a slave girl he had purchased, using the purchase price he still owed him when he could no longer locate him; and a man’s giving away property he had misappropriated from the spoils of war when it could no longer be distributed among the army, with Muʿāwiya’s approval. There are other such cases as well. Moreover, the view that contracts may generally be held in suspense has stronger evidential support and is the position of the majority. This entails no harm whatsoever; rather, it brings benefit without detriment. A man may consider buying, selling, hiring or undertaking an obligation on someone else’s behalf, then consult him. If he approves, it proceeds; otherwise, he has suffered no harm. The same applies to arranging the marriage of a woman under one’s guardianship and similar matters.

Where there is a need, however, this position is indispensable. The case of a missing husband is one in which the ruler’s declaration is contingent upon the husband’s consent if he returns, just as the actions of someone who finds lost property are contingent upon its owner’s consent if he appears. The view that the dowry should be returned to the husband rests on his wife’s passing out of his marital authority. They disagreed, however, over which dowry he may recover:

Is it the dowry he himself gave her, or the one the second husband gave her? There are two reports from Ahmad on this. The correct view is that he may recover only his own dowry, for that is what he is entitled to. He has no right to the dowry the second husband gave her. If the first husband becomes liable to the second for the dowry, may he recover it from her?

There are two reports on this: