the milk that was in the udder at the time of the contract. As for compensating for the milk with something else, and fixing that compensation by revealed law, this is because the milk for which compensation is owed became mixed with the milk produced after the contract, making its quantity impossible to determine. The Lawgiver therefore fixed the compensation to prevent disputes, prescribing something of a different kind because a fixed quantity of the same kind might be greater or less than the original amount, leading to ribā (usury). This does not apply when something of a different kind is given: it is as though the purchaser bought that milk, whose quantity could not be determined, for a sā‘ of dates.

Dates were the food of the people of Medina: an edible staple measured by volume, just as milk is a staple measured by volume. Dates can also be eaten as a staple without preparation, unlike wheat and barley, which require preparation. Of the staple foods they consumed, dates were therefore the closest to milk. Hence, it is a matter open to juristic reasoning whether people in all regions must compensate for that milk with a sā‘ of dates, or whether this applies to those whose staple food is dates. This is open to juristic reasoning, just as is his command to give a sā‘ of barley or dates as zakāt al-fitr, the obligatory charity at the end of Ramadan.

Another example is the claim made by some:

“His command that someone who prays alone behind the row must repeat the prayer runs contrary to analogy, since the imam stands alone, and a woman stands alone behind the men, as established in the Sunnah.”

This is not so. There is agreement that the prescribed practice for the imam is to stand ahead, and that the prescribed practice for those following him is to form rows. How, then, can one situation be compared to the other?