the person upon whom it is incumbent. Those who hold that it is incumbent upon that person as a liability assumed on another’s behalf say that the payment suffices. Those who hold that it is his primary obligation say that this is like paying zakāt on someone else’s behalf.

For the same reason, they disagree over blood money when there is no ‘āqila: does it become a personal liability of the killer or not? Blood money differs from other financial obligations in several respects that warrant its distinctive ruling. The blood money payable for someone killed is a large sum. The ‘āqila bears liability for accidental killing, not intentional killing, without disagreement on the latter. There is disagreement concerning quasi-intentional killing, and the stronger view is that the ‘āqila does not bear liability for it.

A person is excused for an accident. Requiring him to pay blood money from his own wealth would therefore cause him great harm despite his having committed no deliberate sin. Yet compensation for the person killed must be required. The Lawgiver has therefore required those who owe the killer allegiance and support to help him meet this obligation. This resembles the obligation to provide maintenance for relatives, or support for the poor and needy, and the obligation to ransom a captive from enemy territory. For this person is held captive by the blood money he owes. That obligation has arisen neither by his choice nor by that of the person entitled to it, unlike debts arising from loans and sales.

Nor is blood money generally a small sum, as compensation for damaged property is. Accidentally destroying property worth as much as blood money is exceedingly rare, unlike accidentally killing a person. When the intentional act causes loss of life or property, the person responsible is a wrongdoer deserving punishment. When damage to property is accidental, the amount is ordinarily small—unlike blood money.