in contracts is their intended substance. If the intended meaning is the same in both cases, permitting a transaction when expressed in one wording but not another is like permitting it in one language but not another. Admittedly, if one expression entails a ruling that the other does not, that is a different matter. This is not the place to discuss these questions at length.

The purpose here is simply to draw attention to what is described as agreeing with analogy or running counter to it. When the Lawgiver treats two things alike—as He does hiring someone to breastfeed and hiring someone to provide a service—the distinction between them, namely that one involves a tangible substance and the other a benefit, has no bearing on the ruling. Conversely, when He distinguishes between two things, their shared feature cannot, by itself, be the basis of the ruling; rather, the distinguishing feature has an effect.

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Another example is the claim that requiring the ‘āqila (the group responsible for paying blood money) to bear blood money runs counter to analogy.

The response is this: undoubtedly, whoever causes a loss requiring compensation is personally liable for it. Scholars disagree, however, over blood money: does the ‘āqila bear it as a primary obligation, or as a liability assumed on another’s behalf? Similarly, they disagree over zakāt al-fitr that a person must pay on another’s behalf, such as for his wife or child: is it a primary obligation upon him, or one assumed on their behalf? There is a well-known disagreement about this within Ahmad’s school and elsewhere. This distinction determines the ruling when the person on whose behalf it is due pays it without the permission of