preventing them from engaging in sales they need causes even greater harm. He therefore does not spare them slight harm at the cost of exposing them to severe harm. Rather, the greater of two harms is averted by bearing the lesser. Thus, although he prohibited muzābana sales because they involve a form of usury or harmful risk, he permitted them in the case of ‘arāyā sales because of people’s need, since the harm of prohibiting these is greater. Likewise, although he forbade them carrion because of its unwholesomeness as food, he permitted it in cases of necessity, because the harm of death is greater. There are many similar examples.

If it is asked, “But is not all of this contrary to analogy?”

The reply is: We have already explained that the new case possesses a particular feature requiring it to be distinguished from the original case. Every valid distinction runs counter to an invalid analogy. If, however, what is meant is that the original and new cases are identical in the factors that entail the ruling and those that preclude it, yet their rulings differ, this is categorically false.

In short, when one thing resembles another in one respect but differs from it in another, assigning them different rulings on account of their distinguishing feature runs counter to treating them alike on account of their shared feature. Yet this is precisely sound analogy, in both directions: treating like cases alike and distinguishing between unlike cases. By contrast, assigning both the same ruling despite their differing in what entails or precludes that ruling is an invalid analogy. Islamic law invariably invalidates unsound analogies, such as the analogy drawn by Iblīs and that drawn by