the case. Rather, the expressions “release” and “separation” are used in the Quran for something other than divorce. Allah Most High says:

“O you who believe, when you marry believing women and then divorce them before you have touched them, you have no waiting period to count for them. So provide for them and release them graciously.”

He thus commands that they be released after being divorced before consummation. Such a divorce is irrevocable, with no right to take them back. By the consensus of the Muslims, “release” here does not mean pronouncing divorce. Allah Most High also says:

“When you divorce women and they approach the end of their waiting period, retain them honourably.”

And in the other verse:

“Or part with them honourably.”

The expressions “separation” and “release” here do not mean divorce. In the case of a revocably divorced woman, the husband may either take her back or let her go her way; no second divorce is required.

As for the second premise, an expression’s being explicit in the Lawgiver’s speech does not entail that it is explicit in the speech of everyone who uses it.

A fuller discussion belongs elsewhere. The point here is that if someone says, “Leasing is a type of sale,” and means sale in its specific sense—which is what the unqualified word “sale” ordinarily conveys—then this is not so. Such a sale concerns only specified assets or assets owed as a liability. If, however, he means that leasing is a form of exchange in the broad sense, encompassing contracts concerning both assets and usufructs, then this is correct. But his assertion that exchange in this broad sense cannot concern something nonexistent is an unsupported claim—indeed, a false one—for the Lawgiver has permitted exchange in this broad sense involving what does not yet exist. And if he compares the sale of usufructs