its legal effect except through intent. Intent is inward, whereas marriage requires witnesses, and testimony concerns only what is heard.” This is the basis adopted by those followers of al-Shāfi‘ī who restrict the marriage contract to these two expressions. Ibn Hāmid and his followers agreed with them. However, Ahmad’s principles and explicit statements contradict this, for these premises are invalid according to his principles.

As for the assertion that anything other than these two expressions is indirect wording, this would hold only if the classification of expressions as explicit or indirect were determined by scriptural usage. This is the position of al-Shāfi‘ī and those followers of Ahmad who agreed with him, such as al-Khiraqī, Judge Abū Ya‘lā, and others: they maintain that the explicit expressions of divorce are talāq (divorce), firāq (separation), and sarāh (release), because these occur in the Quran.

The majority of scholars, however—including Abū Hanīfah, Mālik, and others—and the majority of Ahmad’s followers, including Abū Bakr, Ibn Hāmid, Abū al-Khattāb, and others, do not accept this principle. Some maintain that the only explicit expression is talāq, including Abū Hanīfah, Ibn Hāmid, Abū al-Khattāb, other followers of Ahmad, and some followers of al-Shāfi‘ī. Others maintain that explicit wording extends beyond these expressions, as is reported from Mālik. This is also the position of Abū Bakr and other followers of Ahmad. The majority say: “Both of the aforementioned premises—that explicit divorce wording is followed by an invalid premise.”

As for their claim that these expressions are explicit in the Lawgiver’s speech, that is not