owed as a contractual obligation is lawful according to the Book of Allah.” He then recited this verse. Permitting this therefore accords with analogy rather than contradicting it.

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As for kitāba (contractual emancipation), those who say that it is contrary to analogy argue that it amounts to selling one’s own property in exchange for one’s own property.

This is not so. Rather, the master sells the slave to himself for a sum that becomes his contractual liability. The master has no claim upon the slave’s capacity to incur obligations; his claim pertains only to his person. The master’s right concerns the slave’s proprietary value as a human being. Insofar as he is subject to commands and prohibitions, however, the slave is a morally accountable human being. Faith, prayer and fasting are therefore obligatory upon him because he is human. Dhimma means a binding covenant. The slave is only required to discharge the obligations he has incurred after his emancipation, when the master no longer owns him.

Contractual emancipation thus consists of selling the slave to himself for a sum he undertakes to pay. Once he has purchased himself, his earnings and the benefit of his labour belong to him. These accrue under the ownership to which the emancipation contract has entitled him. Nevertheless, he is not emancipated under this contract except with permission, because the master has only agreed to relinquish ownership of him on condition that the slave deliver the payment. Whenever the master does not receive that payment and the slave is unable to make it, the master is entitled to reclaim what he sold. This accords with analogy in exchange contracts.

For this reason, he says: If the purchaser cannot pay the price because of insolvency, the seller is entitled to reclaim what he sold. A slave under an emancipation contract is purchasing himself, so his inability to make the payment is like that of any purchaser. This analogy applies to all exchange contracts: whenever