bring him back from somewhere far away. For this reason, the contract is not binding but revocable. If he performs the stipulated work, he is entitled to the reward; otherwise, he is not. The reward may be an undivided share of what the work yields, and its amount may be unknown, provided that this uncertainty does not prevent its delivery. For example, the military commander may say, “Whoever points out a fortress shall have one-third of what it contains,” or tell a raiding party he dispatches, “You shall have one-fifth or one-quarter of the spoils you take.”

The scholars differed concerning a slain enemy’s personal effects: is the slayer entitled to them by virtue of the revealed law, as al-Shāfiʿī held, or only through an express stipulation, as Abū Hanīfa and Mālik held? These are two views, both reported from Ahmad. Those who make this entitlement conditional upon a stipulation place it in this category.

Another instance of this category is offering a physician a reward for curing a patient, which is permissible. Likewise, the Companions of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, accepted a flock that had been offered to them for curing a clan’s chief. One of them recited over him for healing until he recovered, and they took the flock. The reward was for the recovery, not for the recitation. By contrast, hiring a physician under a binding contract to bring about recovery would not be permissible, because recovery is beyond his control: Allah may cure the patient, or He may not. This and similar cases permit a reward contract, but not a binding hire contract.

The third type is where the work itself is not the objective; rather, the objective is the financial return. This is the profit-sharing investment partnership. The owner of the capital has no interest in the worker’s work in itself, unlike someone offering a reward or hiring a worker, whose objective is the work itself. Thus, if the worker were to work