what occurs in the Quran. This is because classifying some speech as figurative is merely a matter of convention, not something determined by religious law, linguistic usage, or reason. Thus, some call an expression figurative when it is used for something distinct from what it denotes, but not when it is used for part of what it denotes. They therefore do not regard a general expression used for only part of its scope as figurative, nor a command intended to convey recommendation. This is the convention followed by most jurists.
They may not describe this as using an expression for something other than what it was assigned to denote, on the grounds that part of a whole is not, without qualification, called something other than that whole. Thus, one out of ten is not said to be something other than those ten, nor a person’s hand something other than that person. Moreover, in their view, figurative usage requires a contextual indicator to establish the intended meaning, except where the indicator serves to exclude an unintended meaning. In the case of a command, the contextual indicator excludes part of what the wording signifies while leaving the remainder signified by the wording itself. By contrast, the contextual indicator accompanying “lion” makes clear that the intended referent does not fall within what the word “lion” denotes when used without qualification.
While most jurists conventionally distinguish between literal and figurative usage in this way, others adopt the convention that whenever an expression is not intended to convey its entire meaning, it is figurative. Most of the latter, however, distinguish between a contextual indicator that is separate or independent and one rooted in the wording, forming part of it, or lacking independent standing. They do not regard the latter cases as figurative, lest they be obliged to consider most speech figurative—even the statement:
“There is no deity worthy of worship except Allah.”
This would be so despite its being known that the polytheists did not dispute