and differentia; for even if this were true, they would not be required to provide it—how much less so when it is false? Rather, what is required is a distinction between what the two terms denote. This is what a nominal definition amounts to, just as one distinguishes between what is denoted by “declinable noun,” “indeclinable noun,” “subject,” and “object,” and between the things denoted by all other terms. They are therefore required to provide a means of distinguishing what they call literal from what they call figurative. Yet no such distinction actually exists, for there are not, in reality, two distinct categories such that one may be called literal and the other figurative.

This is a rational inquiry, distinct from the terminological inquiry, for they acknowledge that the dispute over this question is terminological. They have supposed that this terminology and distinction were transmitted from the Arabs, and in this they are mistaken. Equally mistaken is anyone who supposes that this terminology and distinction occur in the words of the Companions, the Successors, and the leading scholars; that al-Shāfi‘ī or another scholar mentioned them; or that any of these authorities spoke in these terms. This error resembles that of someone brought up with terminology devised by a particular group, who then supposes that the earlier scholars used the same terminology.

Still more plainly mistaken is anyone who supposes that the Arabs themselves made this classification, or that it was received from them through direct transmission, as is found in the writings of some authors on the principles of jurisprudence. Such a claim occurs in the writings of a number of authors, including Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī, al-Qādī Abū al-Tayyib, al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, and others.