The sixth response:

One may contest the second premise, namely his statement:

“If the term were equivocal, one meaning rather than another would not come first to mind when these words are used without qualification, since they necessarily signify their literal meanings equally. Yet there is no doubt that what first comes to mind when ‘lion’ is used without qualification is the beast of prey, and when ‘donkey’ is used without qualification, it is the animal. The same is necessarily true in similar cases.”

The reply is:

When ‘lion’ and ‘donkey’ are used with the definite article al-, they refer to what is known to the speaker or the addressee. If the identified referent is the animal, the word refers to it. This is indeed the familiar referent for most people most of the time. But it does not follow that, when the definite form directs the reference to a dullard or a brave man, the usage cannot also be literal. An example is Abū Bakr’s statement:

“No, by Allah! He would not single out one of Allah’s lions, who fights for Allah and His Messenger, and give you his spoils.”

Likewise, someone may point to a person and say, “This lion,” or to a dullard and say, “This donkey.” Here, definiteness identifies the referent and rules out any other intended meaning. Similarly, when words such as ‘heads,’ ‘eggs,’ and ‘houses’ are used without qualification, ‘heads’ and ‘eggs’ refer to those customarily eaten, while ‘houses’ refers to people’s dwellings. Yet when one says ‘a spider’s house,’ ‘ants’ eggs,’ or ‘locusts’ heads,’ these usages are also literal, by common agreement.

The seventh response:

One may say: You have made the criterion of literal usage that its meaning should come first to mind when the word is used without qualification. Thus, on the listener’s side, you have taken into account what first comes to his mind;