then either the meaning of this attribute is the same as what the term ‘existence’ means in temporally originated beings, or it is different. The former entails that what ‘existence’ denotes is intrinsically necessary in reality, since the Creator’s existence is intrinsically necessary; or else that the Lord’s existence is contingent, since the existence of everything other than Allah is contingent. This is impossible. If the latter is the case, homonymy necessarily follows, which is what was to be proved.”

This, then, is his argument, and it is extremely weak, for it rests on two premises: that the term ‘existence’ applies literally to both the necessary and the contingent, and that this entails homonymy. The second premise is unquestionably false. The first is disputed, contrary to his claim of consensus.

Some have said:

“Every name used to designate a created being can be applied to the Creator only figuratively—even the word ‘thing.’”

This is the position of Jahm and those among the Bātiniyyah (esotericists) who agree with him. These people do not call Him ‘existent’ or ‘a thing,’ nor do they apply any other names to Him.

Others have taken the opposite position, saying:

“Rather, every name applied to the Lord is literal when applied to Him and figurative when applied to anyone else.”

This is the position of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Nāshī of the Muʿtazilah.