And the point here is that expressions with different wordings may have the same meaning, such as julūs and quʿūd (both meaning “sitting”); these are synonyms. Others have distinct meanings, such as “heaven” and “earth.” Still others agree in one respect and differ in another, such as sārim (“a sharp sword”) and muhannad (“a sword made of Indian iron”). This is a third category: the meaning of one is neither distinct from that of the other as heaven is distinct from earth, nor identical to it as the meaning of julūs is identical to that of quʿūd.
Likewise, expressions identical in wording may have the same meaning; these are univocal terms. Or they may have distinct meanings; these are lexically equivocal terms, such as “Suhayl,” used for both the star and a man. Or their meanings may agree in one respect and differ in another. This is a third category, unlike either lexical equivocation or univocal agreement. They thus share an element of meaning in one respect and differ in meaning in another. This, however, occurs only when each expression is qualified by something indicating its particular meaning.
Such expressions are frequent in connected discourse; indeed, they constitute most of the expressions found in the connected discourse of any speaker. For expressions described as univocal—generic nouns such as “messenger,” “governor,” “judge,” “man,” “woman,” “leader,” “house,” and the like—may convey their general meaning, or they may convey a more specific meaning when made definite by a genitive construction or the definite article, as in His words:
“Indeed, We have sent to you a messenger