Second: leaving an expression free of particular qualifications is itself a qualification. Hence it is said that commands have a linguistically designated form which, on its own, indicates a command, and that generality has a linguistically designated form which, on its own, indicates general scope. The very act of uttering an expression without qualification is therefore a qualification. For this reason, its signification is conditional upon withholding particular qualifications; withholding those qualifications is itself a qualification.

Similarly, a noun uttered with the intention of predicating something of it, while leaving it free of explicit grammatical governors, is the subject of a nominal sentence and takes the nominative case. The underlying reason is its freedom from explicit grammatical governors: this absence is a condition of its taking the nominative case, just as qualifying it with an expression such as “kāna” (was), “inna” (indeed), or “zanantu” (I thought) entails a different grammatical ruling.

Thus, a speaker may proceed in either of two ways. Sometimes he falls silent and ends his utterance, intending a particular meaning. At other times he joins that utterance to further speech, conveying a meaning different from what the initial expression would indicate on its own. The initial expression therefore occurs in either of two circumstances: the speaker accompanies it with silence, withholding further speech and leaving it unconnected to anything else; or he accompanies it with an additional expression. In the speaker’s customary usage, withholding further speech conveys one meaning, while continuing conveys another. In both circumstances, his intention has become clear, and he has accompanied his expression with something that clarifies what he intends.

It is well known that an expression signifies a meaning. Signification may depend on either presence or absence. This applies equally to evidence that signifies intrinsically, which may