in the genitive construction. Rather, the genitive construction conveys its meaning just as all other genitive constructions do. Whenever one word is annexed to another, it conveys a meaning specific to that to which it is annexed. Thus, when one says, “Zayd’s hand and head; his knowledge and religion; his statement, judgment, and report,” these expressions denote what is particular to him, even when Zayd’s religion differs from Amr’s—one being unbelief and the other Islam—and his judgment differs from the other’s—one being unjust and the other just—and his report differs from the other’s—one being true and the other false.

Likewise, when one says, “the colour of this and the colour of that,” each has its own particular colour, even if one is black and the other white. The word used in the genitive construction may thus be the same, while the realities in the two instances differ, as with blackness and whiteness. The word “colour” distinguishes one from the other only by being annexed to something that distinguishes it.

If it is said: “The words ‘being,’ ‘religion,’ ‘report,’ and the like, when used without qualification, encompass these various kinds. They are therefore general terms, termed univocal, unlike ‘head,’ ‘back,’ and ‘wing,’ which, when used without qualification, refer only to the body parts of living creatures.”

The reply is: “Grant that this is so. Is it not through the genitive construction that their scope becomes restricted? They were general and unqualified, then became restricted through annexation or being made definite. They therefore fall under the case of a general expression whose scope is restricted through annexation or definiteness. Restricting it in this way is like restricting it through an adjective, an exception, an apposition, or a stated limit, as when one says: ‘the red colour’ and ‘the true report’