this division. To establish the division on this basis would therefore be circular. For one cannot say that these expressions belong to one category rather than the other unless one has established that there are exactly two categories, with no third, and that neither includes anything belonging to the other. Yet this is precisely the point in dispute. How, then, can you make the disputed point a premise in establishing itself, thereby begging the question? The former establishes something by means of itself, so you have supplied no evidence; the latter establishes the underlying principle through a consequence that can only be established by that principle. All this elaboration thus amounts to the height of begging the question.

The second argument:

Among those who affirm literal and figurative usage, some regard certain speech as both literal and figurative, describing a single expression as having both qualities. An example is general expressions whose scope has been restricted. Many have said that these are literal insofar as they signify what remains within their scope, and figurative insofar as they do not signify what has been excluded. According to these scholars, speech is either literal, figurative, or both literal and figurative.

The third argument:

You and a group of scholars, such as al-Rāzī and his followers, including Ibn al-Hājib, say that expressions, before being used but after being assigned meanings, are neither literal nor figurative; or that a figurative expression is one used in a sense other than that for which it was assigned. Accordingly, unless they establish that expressions such as “the back of the road,” “the wing of travel,” and the like were assigned one meaning and then used in another, they have not established that these expressions are figurative—and there is no way