jurisprudence, among both jurists and speculative theologians—then it is well known that the first person known to have treated the principles of jurisprudence separately was al-Shāfi‘ī. Yet he did not divide speech into literal and figurative usage. Indeed, despite his frequent and extensive use of evidence and his knowledge of legal proofs, he is not known to have described any speech as figurative, nor did he mention this in any of his books, whether al-Risālah or elsewhere.

Thus, anyone who believes that the renowned scholars qualified to exercise independent legal judgment, along with other imams of Islam and scholars of the early generations, divided speech into literal and figurative usage, as some later scholars did, holds this belief out of ignorance and limited familiarity with the writings of the religious imams and the early Muslims. Likewise, another group may suppose that this distinction was learned through direct transmission from Arab speech, and that the Arabs themselves said, “This is literal, and this is figurative.” Some writers on the principles of jurisprudence have supposed this, owing to their ignorance of Arab speech, as will be discussed later, Allah Most High willing. Similarly, some suppose that what appears in the writings of certain later scholars, such as al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and Ibn al-Hājib, represents the position of the renowned imams and their followers. Yet they are unfamiliar with the principles of jurisprudence set out by the followers of al-Shāfi‘ī, Mālik, Abū Hanīfah, Ahmad, and others in accordance with their imams’ methods. This, too, stems from ignorance and limited knowledge.

If the person attributing this view to many legal theorists says:

“By this I mean most authors on the principles of jurisprudence from among the proponents of speculative theology and reasoned opinion, such as the Mu‘tazilah, the Ash‘ariyyah, and the followers of