legal proofs and things that are not such proofs is even better acquainted with their general category. Likewise, someone who can distinguish individual human beings from other beings must necessarily be able to distinguish their species, for individuals cannot be distinguished without distinguishing species.

Moreover, in discussing questions of legal theory, legal theorists cite the views of scholars qualified to exercise independent legal judgment, such as Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Awzā‘ī, Abū Hanīfah, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and Dāwūd, as well as the views of their followers. Indeed, these scholars and others like them have the strongest claim to knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence, since they knew their particular instances and employed these principles in establishing legal rulings. This contrasts with those who discuss hypothetical principles in the abstract—some of which exist and others do not—without knowing their particular instances. Even if what these people say were true, it would be of little or no benefit, since it amounts to discussing proofs conceived in the mind that have no concrete existence. They resemble someone who discusses jurisprudence in relation to hypothetical human actions while not knowing the rulings on actions that actually occur. How much more so when most of what they say about these hypothetical matters is false!

Thus, if the designation “legal theorists” includes the renowned scholars whose independent legal judgments are followed, such as the four imams, al-Thawrī, al-Awzā‘ī, al-Layth ibn Sa‘d, Ishāq ibn Rāhawayh, and others; and if by “legal theorists” is meant those who discuss the principles of jurisprudence separately from particular proofs, as al-Shāfi‘ī, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and those after them did, as did ‘Īsā ibn Abān and others like him, and as did the authors who wrote on the principles of