intentional killing. Others disagreed with him on this because the resemblance was disregarded. In reality, however, it is a type of accidental killing distinguished by an additional ruling; it is therefore not a subdivision of the accidental killing mentioned in the Quran.

Another example is the question of executing a Muslim for killing an unbeliever or a non-Muslim under Muslim protection, and a free person for killing a slave. There are three positions on this:

The first is that he is executed in retaliation in all circumstances. This is the position of Abū Hanīfa and his followers.

The second is that he is never executed in retaliation. This is the position of al-Shāfi‘ī and one of the two positions reported from Ahmad.

The third is that he is executed only in cases of brigandage. Execution in such cases is a prescribed punishment serving the public interest, so equivalence between the perpetrator and the victim is not required: a free person is executed even if the victim was a slave, and a Muslim even if the victim was a non-Muslim under Muslim protection. This is the position of the scholars of Medina and the other position reported from Ahmad. It is the most balanced position, and it also reconciles the reports transmitted on this subject. Mālik’s position concerning brigands and others is that the same ruling applies to the supporting accomplice and the direct perpetrator, just as scholars agree on the corresponding principle in jihad.

Those who dispute this with him nevertheless concede that people who jointly commit a killing are liable to execution in retaliation. This is agreed upon in the schools of the leading imams, as ‘Umar said: “Had all the people of Sana’a conspired in his killing, I would have executed them all for him.” If all were direct perpetrators, there is no disagreement. If some were not direct perpetrators, but brought about the killing through a cause that would ordinarily lead to death—such as a person acting under coercion, a false witness who subsequently retracts his testimony, or an unjust judge who subsequently retracts his judgment—the majority concede Mālik’s position that these people are liable to execution in retaliation. This is illustrated by what ‘Alī, may Allah be pleased with him, said concerning the two men who testified that a man had stolen