and this accords more closely with the transmitted reports and legal analogy, so that semen from lawful intercourse is not mixed with semen from unlawful intercourse. Abū Hanīfa disagreed with Mālik, permitting the marriage contract but not intercourse, while al-Shāfiʿī permitted both. Ahmad agreed with Mālik and went further: he did not permit marriage to a woman who had committed fornication until she repented, because the Quran and hadiths indicate that marrying such a woman is forbidden. As for those who claim that this has been abrogated and that what is meant here is intercourse, the unsoundness of their position is evident on several grounds.

Likewise, there is the question of whether two waiting periods arising from relations with two different men may run concurrently—for example, when a woman marries during her waiting period or has intercourse under a mistaken presumption of lawfulness. Mālik’s position is that the two waiting periods do not run concurrently; rather, she must observe a separate waiting period for each man. This is what is reported from ʿUmar and ʿAlī, may Allah be pleased with them both, and it is also the position of al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad. Abū Hanīfa, however, held that they run concurrently.

Likewise, there is the question of intercourse with a second husband: does it cancel the effect of fewer than three prior divorces? This concerns a man who divorces his wife once or twice, after which she marries another man who consummates the marriage, and then returns to her first husband. According to Mālik, she returns with only the remaining number of divorces available to her first husband. This is the view of the leading Companions, such as ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb and others like him. It is also the position of al-Shāfiʿī and, according to the well-known report from him, Ahmad. Only Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās held that she does not return subject to the remaining number of divorces; this is also Abū Hanīfa’s position.