because that undermines fairness in the partnership. The principle adopted by the scholars of Medina in this matter is sounder than that of others, which requires remuneration at the customary rate. The former is correct, for the contract was not for the labor itself; hence, the work did not have to be specified. Moreover, remuneration at the customary rate might exceed the capital and its profit combined.

Under an invalid contract, one is entitled only to the counterpart of what one would receive under a valid contract. Thus, if what is payable under a valid sale and lease is a price and rent, a share of the profit becomes payable under an invalid contract; what is payable under an invalid contract is a share of the profit. The same applies to orchard-tending partnerships, sharecropping, and other such arrangements.

Where the position of the later Medinan scholars on this subject is weak, that of the Kufan scholars is weaker still. It seems that all this belongs to the newly introduced reasoning known to those of the early generations who criticized it. What the Sunnah and established practice prescribe, however, is justice.

Anyone who reflects on the underlying principles will recognize that orchard-tending partnerships, sharecropping, and profit-sharing investment partnerships are closer to justice than leasing. Leasing involves risk: the lessee may or may not benefit. By contrast, in orchard-tending partnerships and sharecropping, both parties share in gains and losses. These arrangements therefore do not expose either party to the same degree of risk as leasing.