He is also told:

“Our aim in this argument is not to establish that the threat of punishment applies to the disputed case, but to establish the validity of citing the hadith containing that threat as evidence concerning the disputed case. The hadith conveys two rulings: prohibition and the threat of punishment. What you have mentioned only challenges its indication of the threat of punishment, whereas our purpose here is to explain its indication of prohibition. If you maintain that the hadiths threatening those who curse do not encompass cursing whose permissibility is disputed, then no evidence remains for prohibiting such cursing. The cursing under discussion is precisely of this disputed kind, as explained earlier. If it is not forbidden, then it is permissible.”

Or it may be said:

“If there is no evidence establishing its prohibition, it is impermissible to believe it forbidden. Moreover, grounds for permitting it exist: namely, the hadiths cursing those who commit this act. Scholars have differed over whether it is permissible to curse such a person, and on this assumption there is no evidence prohibiting it. It is therefore obligatory to act upon the evidence supporting its permissibility, since no opposing evidence stands against it.”

This refutes the objection. The questioner is thus caught in circularity from another direction. This further circularity arises because most texts prohibiting cursing also contain a threat of punishment. If texts containing threats of punishment cannot be cited as evidence concerning disputed cases, they cannot be cited as evidence against cursing whose permissibility is disputed, as explained earlier.

If he were to say:

“I rely on scholarly consensus as evidence that this cursing is forbidden,”

he would be told:

“Consensus has been established that it is forbidden to curse a specific virtuous individual.