I regard his cursing someone who commits the disputed act as itself a matter open to independent judgment. I believe him mistaken in this, just as I may believe the one who permits the act mistaken. There are three positions concerning the disputed case:

The first is that it is permissible.

The second is that it is forbidden and that the threat of punishment applies.

The third is that it is forbidden without this severe threat applying.

I may choose this third position because the evidence establishes both that the act is forbidden and that cursing someone who commits the disputed act is forbidden, while believing that the hadith threatening punishment for the perpetrator and for the one who curses does not encompass these two cases.”

The questioner is then told:

“If you allow that cursing this perpetrator is a matter open to independent judgment, then the apparent meaning of the explicit text may be invoked as evidence for it. In that case, there is no assurance that the disputed case is not intended by the hadith containing the threat of punishment. Moreover, the grounds for including it are present, so the text must be acted upon. But if you do not allow this to be a matter open to independent judgment, then cursing him is definitively forbidden. There is no doubt that anyone who curses a scholar exercising independent judgment, when that curse is definitively forbidden, falls within the threat of punishment directed at those who curse—even if he acts on an interpretation, as does someone who curses some of the righteous predecessors.

“Thus, the circularity is unavoidable, whether you hold that cursing someone who commits the disputed act is definitively forbidden or allow legitimate disagreement over it. The belief you have stated does not invalidate the use of the texts containing threats of punishment as evidence under either assumption. This is clear.”