and said: “It is a good hadith.” Another report states:

“No man curses something undeserving of it without the curse returning upon him.”

This threatened punishment for cursing—such that whoever curses someone undeserving of it is himself cursed, such cursing is wickedness, and it excludes one from the rank of utmost truthfulness, intercession, and bearing witness—applies to anyone who curses someone undeserving of it. Thus, if someone who performs a disputed act does not fall within the scope of the text, he does not deserve the curse, and whoever curses him becomes liable to this threatened punishment. Those scholars exercising independent judgment who considered the disputed case to fall within the hadith would therefore themselves be liable to this threatened punishment.

If the objectionable consequence follows both on the assumption that the disputed case is excluded and on the assumption that it remains included, then it is clear that this is not an objectionable consequence and does not prevent the hadith from being cited as evidence. If the objectionable consequence does not follow on either assumption, then no objectionable consequence arises at all.

For once this necessary connection is established, and it is known that their coming under the threat on the assumption of inclusion entails their coming under it on the assumption of exclusion, one of two things must hold: either both the antecedent and its consequent obtain, meaning that they all come under the threat, or neither the consequent nor its antecedent obtains, meaning that none of them comes under it. For when the antecedent obtains, its consequent obtains; and when the consequent is absent, its antecedent is absent.

This much suffices to refute the objection. What we believe, however, is that in fact they do not come under the threat on either assumption, as already established. This is because coming under the threat is conditional upon having no excuse for the act, whereas someone who has an excuse recognized by Islamic law is not