blame does not attach to a scholar exercising independent judgment. Indeed, we even say that declaring something forbidden to be lawful is a greater sin than committing it; nevertheless, whoever has an excuse remains excused.

If it is asked: “Who, then, is punished? Whoever commits this forbidden act is either exercising independent scholarly judgment or following the authority of someone who does, and both are exempt from punishment.”

We reply that there are several answers:

First:

The purpose is to explain that this act constitutes grounds for punishment, whether or not anyone actually commits it. If we suppose that everyone who commits it either lacks a condition necessary for punishment or has an impediment preventing it, this does not detract from its being forbidden. Rather, we recognize that it is forbidden so that those to whom its prohibition becomes clear may avoid it. That someone who commits it has an excuse is part of Allah’s mercy towards him.

Similarly, minor sins are forbidden even though they are expiated by avoiding major sins. This is the case with all forbidden acts whose prohibition is disputed. If it becomes clear that they are forbidden—even though someone who commits them may be excused because he is exercising independent scholarly judgment or following scholarly authority—that does not prevent us from believing them to be forbidden.

Second:

Explaining the ruling is a means of removing the uncertainty that prevents punishment from applying. An excuse arising from a belief is not meant to remain; rather, what is sought is its removal as far as possible. Otherwise, there would be no obligation to impart knowledge, and leaving