those who are excused on account of ignorance, independent scholarly reasoning, or reliance on scholarly authority. The ruling still encompasses those without an excuse, just as it encompasses cases on which there is agreement. This entails fewer restrictions on its general scope and is therefore preferable.

Eighth:

If we understand the wording in this way, it identifies the grounds for the curse, while the ruling does not apply to those excepted because an impediment prevents its application. Undoubtedly, promises and warnings need not expressly exclude those for whom they do not take effect because of a countervailing factor. The wording thus remains entirely sound.

If, however, we understand the curse as applying to the commission of an act unanimously held to be forbidden, or take its grounds to be a belief contrary to scholarly consensus, then the grounds for the curse would not be mentioned in the hadith. Moreover, that general wording would still require exceptions. Since exceptions are necessary under either interpretation, accepting them under the first is preferable: it accords with the apparent meaning of the wording and requires no unstated qualification.

Ninth:

The sole reason for this interpretation is to deny that the curse applies to someone who has an excuse. We have already explained that hadiths containing warnings are intended to establish that the act in question is a cause for that curse. Their meaning is therefore: “This act is a cause for being cursed.” Such a statement would not entail that the ruling takes effect in the case of every individual. It would, however, entail that the cause is present even where the ruling does not follow, and there is nothing objectionable in this. We have already established that