and at other times by conclusive evidence. What is required is not absolute certainty concerning the threatened punishment, but belief, whether amounting to certainty or strong probability, just as this is what is required concerning practical rulings.

There is no difference between believing that Allah has prohibited something and threatened its perpetrator with punishment in general, and believing that Allah has prohibited it and threatened its perpetrator with a particular punishment: both involve reporting something about Allah. Just as the former may be reported on the basis of evidence generally, so may the latter. Indeed, it would be correct to say: “Acting upon these hadiths concerning threatened punishment is even more imperative.”

For this reason, they were more lenient concerning the chains of transmission of hadiths encouraging good deeds and warning against wrongdoing than they were concerning those of hadiths establishing legal rulings. Belief in the threatened punishment prompts people to refrain from the act. If that threatened punishment is true, the person will have escaped it. If it is not true, and the punishment for the act is instead lighter than the threatened punishment, then, provided he refrains from that act, his mistaken belief in a more severe punishment will not harm him. For if he believes the punishment to be less severe, he may also be mistaken. Likewise, if he neither affirms nor denies that greater severity, he may be mistaken. Such an error may make the act seem less serious to him, so that he commits it and deserves the more severe punishment, if it is established, or brings upon himself the grounds for deserving it.

Thus, error in belief is the same under either assumption—whether one believes in the threatened punishment or does not—whereas deliverance from punishment, on the assumption that one believes in