can themselves yield certain knowledge, they cannot invariably be treated as subordinate to the report, just as the report cannot be treated as subordinate to them. Rather, each may lead sometimes to certain knowledge and sometimes to probable belief, even when grounds for certain knowledge from both happen to coincide, or grounds for certain knowledge from one coincide with grounds for probable belief from the other. Those with greater knowledge of reports may be certain of the truth of reports whose truth others less knowledgeable cannot establish with certainty.

Sometimes scholars differ over whether a hadith’s meaning is conclusive because they disagree over whether its meaning is unequivocal or merely presumptive. If it is presumptive, does it contain anything that rules out the less likely interpretation? This too is a vast subject. Some scholars may be certain of what particular hadiths signify, while others are not: either because they know that the hadith admits only that meaning, because they know that interpreting it in the alternative sense is precluded, or because of other evidence that establishes certainty.

As for the second category, that which is presumptive, it must be acted upon in matters of Islamic law, according to the agreement of scholars of recognized authority. If, however, it contains a proposition to be believed, such as a threat of punishment or the like, they have differed concerning it.

Some groups of jurists hold that when a solitary report from an upright narrator contains a threat of punishment for an act, it must be acted upon by treating that act as prohibited, but not by affirming the threatened punishment unless the report is conclusive. The same applies if the text is conclusively established but its meaning is only presumptive. On this basis they interpreted the words of ‘Ā’ishah, may Allah be pleased with her: “Tell