that the Medinan scholars differed on that issue, and that even if they had reached a consensus while others disagreed with them, the authoritative proof would lie in the report.
Another example is the way some scholars from both cities counter certain hadiths with clear analogical reasoning, on the premise that universal principles cannot be overturned by a report of this kind. There are other forms of counterargument as well, whether those advancing them are right or mistaken.
These ten reasons are evident. In the case of many hadiths, a scholar may have grounds for not acting upon a hadith of which we are unaware. The avenues to knowledge are vast, and we have not discovered everything within the minds of scholars. A scholar may or may not disclose his evidence; if he does, it may or may not reach us; and if it reaches us, we may or may not understand how it supports his argument, whether or not that evidence is actually sound.
Yet, although we acknowledge this possibility, we may not abandon a position whose evidence has become clear through an authentic hadith, and which a group of scholars has adopted, in favor of another position held by a scholar who might possess something that counters this evidence—even if he is more learned. For scholars’ opinions are more susceptible to error than the revealed proofs: the revealed proofs constitute Allah’s binding evidence against all His servants, unlike a scholar’s opinion.