which others do not regard as counterevidence, either in itself or as a category, or which does not in fact constitute stronger counterevidence. An example is the way many Kufan scholars counter an authentic hadith with the apparent meaning of the Quran, believing that the Quran’s apparent meaning—such as the general scope of its wording—takes precedence over the explicit wording of the hadith. A scholar may also regard a meaning as apparent when it is not, given the many ways in which statements convey meaning.

For this reason, they rejected the hadith concerning one witness together with an oath, although other scholars know that nothing in the Quran’s apparent meaning precludes issuing a judgment on the basis of one witness and an oath. Even if it did, these other scholars hold that the Sunnah explains the Quran. Al-Shāfi'ī has a well-known discussion of this principle, and Ahmad has his celebrated treatise refuting those who claim that the Quran’s apparent meaning suffices without the explanation provided by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. In it, he presents more evidence than there is room to recount here.

Another instance is rejecting a report that restricts the general scope of the Book, qualifies its unrestricted wording, or adds to it. Those who take this position believe that an addition to a text, like the qualification of unrestricted wording, constitutes abrogation, and that restricting the scope of general wording also constitutes abrogation.

Another example is the way a group of Medinan scholars counter an authentic hadith with the practice of the people of Medina, on the premise that they unanimously agree on a position contrary to the report, and that their consensus constitutes evidence taking precedence over it. This includes departing from the hadiths concerning the right to cancel a sale before the parties separate, on the basis of this principle, even though most scholars may well demonstrate