how the hadith indicates the ruling, but believes that this indication is invalid because he holds principles that rule it out, whether those principles are in fact correct or mistaken. For example, he may believe that a general expression whose scope has been partially restricted has no probative force; that an implied meaning has no probative force; that a general expression occasioned by a particular circumstance applies only to that circumstance; that an unqualified command does not entail obligation, or does not require immediate compliance; that an expression made definite by the definite article does not have general scope; that statements negating acts negate neither the acts themselves nor all their legal effects; or that textual implication does not establish generality, so that no general scope is claimed for unstated elements and implied meanings. There are many other matters of this kind that could be discussed at length.

Indeed, disputed questions making up half of legal theory fall under this heading, although abstract principles do not encompass all the disputed forms of indication. This heading also includes particular instances of the various classes of indication: does a given instance belong to that class or not? For example, a scholar may believe that a particular expression is indeterminate because it has two meanings and there is no indication specifying which is intended, or for some other reason.

The eighth reason:

The scholar believes that this indication is countered by evidence showing that it is not intended. Examples include countering a general expression with a specific one, an unrestricted expression with a qualified one, an unqualified command with evidence negating obligation, or a literal meaning with evidence indicating a figurative meaning, along with other forms of conflicting evidence. This, too, is a vast subject: conflicts between the meanings conveyed by statements, and the grounds for giving some precedence over others, constitute a vast, deep ocean.