—and these are the positions against which al-Harrāsī wrote a refutation and which were defended by several scholars, including Ibn ‘Aqīl, Judge Abū Ya‘lā the Younger, Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, and Abū Muhammad ibn al-Muthannā—in most such cases, the position of Mālik and Ahmad is stronger than the opposing view. Where the opposing view is stronger, Ahmad is reported to have held differing positions on the matter.

Examples include invalidating legal stratagems that evade zakat, defeat the right of pre-emption, and the like, as well as stratagems that render usury, indecent acts, and similar things permissible; taking purposes and intentions into account in contracts; and interpreting oaths by reference to their occasion and what prompted them, together with the oath-taker’s intention.

Another example is imposing the prescribed punishments on offenders as the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and his rightly guided caliphs did, as when they imposed the prescribed punishment for drinking intoxicants on the evidence of smell, vomit, and the like.

Further examples include taking customary practice into account in contractual conditions, treating a customary condition like an expressly stated condition, and accepting common usage as sufficient in contracts expressed in general terms. Whatever people regard as a sale is a sale; whatever they regard as a lease is a lease; whatever they regard as a gift is a gift; and whatever they regard as an endowment is an endowment. No particular wording is required for any of these. There are many similar examples.