On this basis, suppose he was not conscious of the countervailing factor that prevents inclusion, but, were he to become conscious of it, would know that he did not intend to include that individual. Can it be said that, in terms of meaning, his ruling and intent did not encompass that individual, even though his wording and its general meaning did? This may indeed be said. For he intended the universal, shared meaning in its general scope, but did not intend to include individuals possessing a feature that, in his judgment, opposes and outweighs that general meaning.

Moreover, he is not required to call to mind all preventing factors across kinds and individuals, given their great number. Even if he were conscious of some of them, it would not be appropriate to address each and every one explicitly to rule it out, for such speech would be ungainly, awkward, long-winded, and inarticulate. Knowing these preventing factors, explaining them, or both, may therefore be difficult or impossible. Here, the countervailing characteristics possessed by particular individuals prevent their intended inclusion by the speaker, even though his wording and its general meaning encompass them by virtue of what they share with the others.

Accordingly, if he might regard that factor as preventing inclusion, but might not, should we judge that the individual is included because the grounds for inclusion are present and the presumption is that no qualifying factor exists? Or should we suspend judgment because the grounds are present but a countervailing factor is possible? This requires consideration.

The proponent of the second view may say: “So long as this preventing factor is present, it prevents those grounds from actually entailing inclusion.”

The proponent of the first view may say: “Rather, their capacity to entail inclusion is established, whereas the preventing factor is doubtful.”

The more evident view is to suspend judgment concerning the speaker’s intent in such a case.