Al-IstiqamaIbn Taimiya

, then, if hatred and resistance are absent, there must be an opposing impediment—and that is what prompts willingness and acquiescence. A person may neither will nor dislike something because there is no cause prompting either willingness or dislike. But when such a cause is present, its effect must follow unless an impediment intervenes. Thus, someone who neither hates nor resists a forbidden act committed upon him, despite being able to resist, is both willing and acting. This is why he is described as a willing participant, even though hatred of the act and willingness may coexist in his heart in different respects, just as someone compelled to do something may both will the act he is compelled to perform and dislike it in different respects.

Thus, someone who has forbidden food poured into his mouth and can resist but does not, or upon whom an indecent sexual act is committed and who can resist but does not, sins both by neglecting the dislike and resistance required of him and by engaging in the willingness and participation forbidden to him. He can be considered neither willing nor acting only if his dislike is complete, and such dislike necessarily entails resisting to the extent of his ability.

If, however, his dislike is incomplete, willingness accompanies dislike of this kind; in such a case, action inevitably accompanies it as well. This is because the cause prompting complete dislike is present: the act’s prohibition and the punishment it entails. If this dislike does not arise, it is either because the prompting cause—knowledge of that prohibition and punishment—is weak, or because an impediment is present, namely a kind of willingness

فَإِذا لم يُوجد البغض والامتناع فَلَا بُد من معَارض مَانع وَذَلِكَ هُوَ الْمُقْتَضى للإرادة والتمكين فالإنسان قد لَا يُرِيد الشَّيْء وَلَا يكرههُ لعدم سَبَب الارادة وَالْكَرَاهَة فَأَما مَعَ وجود الْمُقْتَضى فَلَا بُد من وجود مُقْتَضَاهُ الا لمَانع فَلهَذَا من لم يبغض وَلم يمْتَنع عَن فعل الْمحرم بِهِ مَعَ قدرته على الِامْتِنَاع فَأَنَّهُ يكون مرِيدا فَاعِلا وَلِهَذَا يُقَال انه مُطَاوع وان كَانَ قد يجْتَمع فِي قلبه البغض لذَلِك والارادة باعتبارين كَمَا يجْتَمع فِي قلب الْمُكْره على الشَّيْء ارادة فعل الْمُكْره عَلَيْهِ وَكَرَاهَة ذَلِك باعتبارين فَمن أوجر طَعَاما محرما يقدر على الِامْتِنَاع مِنْهُ فَلم يفعل اَوْ فعل بِهِ فَاحِشَة يقدر على الِامْتِنَاع مِنْهَا فَلم يفعل كَانَت مَعْصِيَته بترك مَا وَجب عَلَيْهِ من الْكَرَاهَة والامتناع وبفعل مَا نهى من الارادة والمطاوعة وَلَا يكون غير مُرِيد وَلَا فَاعل الا اذا كَانَ كَارِهًا تَامّ الْكَرَاهَة وَذَلِكَ يُوجب فعل الْمَقْدُور عَلَيْهِ من الِامْتِنَاع فَأَما اذا كَانَ كَارِهًا كَرَاهَة قَاصِرَة فَإِن الارادة تصْحَب مثل هَذِه الْكَرَاهَة وَفِي مثل هَذَا يصحبها الْفِعْل لَا محَالة لِأَن الْمُقْتَضى لكَمَال الْكَرَاهَة قَائِم وَهُوَ مَا فِي ذَلِك من الْحُرْمَة والعقوبة فَإِذا لم تحصل هَذِه الْكَرَاهَة فإمَّا لضعف الْمُقْتَضى وَهُوَ الْعلم فِي ذَلِك من الْحُرْمَة والعقوبة واما لوُجُود الْمَانِع وَهُوَ نوع من الارادة

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