We therefore say: jurisprudence is acquaintance with the rulings governing people’s actions, whether that acquaintance amounts to knowledge, probable judgment, or the like.

Anyone who reflects on the Sharia knows that the rulings governing people’s actions in general are known, rather than merely probable. Probable judgment concerns only a very small number of cases, and only for some jurists exercising independent judgment. As for actions generally, their implications and occurrences, most of their rulings are known, and all praise belongs to Allah. By this I mean that knowledge of them is possible and is attained by those who diligently investigate them and establish them through scriptural evidence. I do not mean that everyone possesses this knowledge, nor even most students of jurisprudence who follow their imams unquestioningly. Rather, most of what these people possess is probable judgment or unquestioning adherence.

A man may adopt the school of one of the imams and begin transmitting his opinions on those questions. He may perhaps lend them some plausibility through weak evidence drawn from analogy or the apparent meaning of a text—if he is accomplished. Otherwise, he contents himself with merely transmitting the position from the imam who held it, provided that he grasps it accurately, understands it, and reports it truthfully. Otherwise, he possesses nothing beyond memorization of its wording, if he has memorized it at all; failing that, he is lying, making unfounded claims, or mistaken.

There is no doubt that what these people possess is not knowledge. Likewise, as for ordinary people who follow scholars in the fatwas they give them, [what they possess] is not knowledge of those matters based on