upon this probable judgment. Whoever acts upon that evidence follows knowledge, not probability. But to turn jurisprudence itself—which is knowledge—into probability is a blatant alteration. Their astute followers have recognized the flaw in this answer.

Another group, including Abū al-Khattāb and others, may answer this question by saying that knowledge encompasses both certainty and belief judged most likely to be true, as in the words of the Most High:

“Then if you know them to be believers” [Surah al-Mumtahanah 10].

They maintain that restricting the word “knowledge” to matters of certainty is a convention of the speculative theologians, whereas expressions are to be understood according to the language, not a specialized convention.

The purpose here is to establish two principles. The first is to demonstrate the falsity of their claim that jurisprudence belongs to the realm of probable judgments, and to show that it is more deserving of the name “knowledge” than the speculative theology they claim is knowledge. Likewise, the methods of jurisprudence are more deserving of being called evidence than the methods of speculative theology.

The second principle is to show that most of what they discuss concerning foundational matters is neither knowledge nor sound probable judgment, but rather unsound conjecture and compound ignorance.

These two principles entail that disagreement over their questions does not warrant declaring people unbelievers, and that reflection on practical matters of jurisprudence may be more appropriate than reflection on their questions.