act upon these probable judgments and beliefs derived from what they term the indications of jurisprudence.

It is well known that this knowledge belongs to the principles of jurisprudence. It is not specific to any particular question, nor does it discuss any rulings concerning actions such as prayer, jihad, prescribed punishments, and the like. Rather, it is a general, universal principle, which everyone agrees is not jurisprudence itself. Jurisprudence concerns commands to perform these actions and prohibitions against them, whether known with certainty or judged probable.

According to their position, then, jurisprudence consists of probable judgments that these actions are obligatory, prohibited, or permissible. These probable judgments are what the evidence they call “indications,” such as solitary reports and analogy, establishes. Once these probable judgments are attained, jurisprudence, in their view, has been attained.

As for the obligation to know this probable judgment, that is another matter. What they have stated is suitable only as an answer to someone who asks: “How can it be permissible for you to act upon probability?” This question arises in the principles of jurisprudence when establishing the validity of these methods. If it is said that they yield only probability, the objection is raised: “How can following probability be permissible when the evidence of revelation indicates otherwise?”

They reply that what is followed is nothing other than the conclusive evidence requiring action