under Islamic law, these scholars—such as Judge Abū Bakr, al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and jurists of the various schools who agreed with them, including Abū al-Khattāb and others—raised the familiar objection here: jurisprudence concerns probable judgments, since it rests on rulings derived from solitary reports, analogy, general expressions, and apparent meanings, all of which yield only probability. How, then, could you classify it as knowledge by using the word “knowledge” in your definition?

They answered that the jurist knows that, once he reaches such a probable judgment, he is obliged to act upon it. As al-Rāzī said:

“If you ask, ‘Jurisprudence concerns probable judgments, so how could you classify it as knowledge?’

“I reply: ‘When a scholar exercising independent judgment considers it most likely that one case shares with another the operative basis of its ruling, he becomes certain that he is obliged to know what his probable judgment has led him to. Knowledge is thus attained with certainty, while probability enters into the process of attaining it.’”

Some jurists who examined the foundations of jurisprudence thought this answer weak because of his statement: “Knowledge is thus attained with certainty, while probability enters into the process of attaining it.”