to the point that they came to be called the Wāqifah (those who suspend judgment). Speech is of two kinds: commands and statements. They denied that imperative forms signify commands, and that the forms of general statements signify generality.

One consequence of this is their claim that the questions of speculative theology they discuss are matters of definitive certainty. Yet no group of Muslim scholars is more divided or embroiled in disagreement than they are. Each faction’s claim is met by its opponent’s claim, which the latter declares to be certain. Indeed, even a single individual among them contradicts himself: two individuals or two factions—or even the same individual or faction—claim self-evident knowledge of a thing and its opposite. Despite this pervasive inconsistency, they declare one another unbelievers, in keeping with the principles of the Khārijites, the Rāfidah, the Muʿtazilah, and many of the Ashʿarīs.

At the end of their works on the foundations of jurisprudence, they say that only one position is correct concerning the foundations of religion, whereas in subsidiary matters every scholar exercising independent judgment is correct.

They then composed works on the foundations of jurisprudence—a discipline shared by jurists and speculative theologians—building it upon their corrupt principles. This extends even to its very first question, namely the definition of jurisprudence: when they defined it as knowledge of the rulings governing the actions of those legally accountable