First, whether “speech,” when used without qualification—without being attributed to the soul, the heart, or the like—denotes meanings alone, letters alone, or meanings and letters together.

There are three views on this. Al-Qushayrī and one group hold the first view. Another group of theologians, jurists, and Arabic scholars hold the second. The early generations of the Muslim community and its leading scholars, however, hold the middle position, namely the third: when used without qualification, “speech” encompasses both letters and meanings.

The Prophet’s saying, peace and blessings be upon him, “Allah has pardoned my community for what they say to themselves, so long as they neither utter it nor act upon it,” distinguishes between discourse explicitly attributed to the soul and speech without qualification.

Second, whether the meaning of speech to which its verbal expression corresponds belongs to the category of knowledge and acts of will, or whether it is not of this kind but is a different reality altogether. This is disputed among both the groups that affiliate themselves with the Sunnah and those that do not. Within each of these two groups, some hold one view and others hold the other.

It is thus clear that what al-Junayd mentioned concerning the heart’s speech is not the position of those who say that speech is the meaning subsisting in the soul.

As for Abū al-Qāsim’s statement that this is the position of scholars of religious fundamentals generally, there is no