any discussion of them, whether the need be urgent or otherwise.

86. Since such discussion is not obligatory, it cannot be deemed permissible, for several reasons:

First, were it permissible, remaining silent about it would likewise be permissible. In that case, the silent one would certainly be safe, for there is unanimous agreement that silence incurs no blame, whereas the interpreter would be exposing himself to grave danger for no pressing need—and that is impermissible. Moreover, the one who keeps silent about figurative interpretation says nothing about Allah except the truth, while the interpreter may well speak untruth about Allah, attributing to Him what He has not attributed to Himself and denying Him an attribute He has affirmed for Himself. This is prohibited; therefore silence is mandatory and figurative interpretation must be forbidden.

87. Another line of argument: when a word can bear several meanings, assigning it—without proof—to one specific meaning is mere conjecture and amounts to speaking about Allah without knowledge. Allah has forbidden this, saying, “and that you say about Allah what you do not know” (al-Aʿrāf 7:33).

88. Furthermore, to single out one of the possible meanings without a revealed indication requires first compiling every potential meaning—literal or figurative—for which the word is ever used, then disproving all of them save one. This would demand comprehensive mastery of every dialect and complete knowledge of the entire Arabic language—an impossibility. How, then, could someone with no expertise in the language accomplish it, when he may recognise only two or three vague senses, and those merely by imitation?

89. Finally, rejecting the alternative meanings hinges on authoritative revelation, for the attributes of Allah are affirmed or denied solely by revealed texts. When such proof is lacking, it is impossible to specify any one meaning with certainty. One is therefore obliged to believe in them as they stand, in the sense Allah intended.