because scholars differ over whether she may look at the patient; nonetheless, it should be deemed lawful when necessity dictates, just as it is for a male physician. It is still preferable that she not act as the midwife when a Muslim woman is available.

If they bring a case before our judge together with a Muslim, judgment between them is obligatory, for this secures justice for the Muslim or restrains him from wrongdoing—both of which are duties; refusing to hear the case would squander rights.

When some of them—that is, the dhimmis—litigate with one another, even a wife against her husband, or when two mustaʾmins (non-Muslims under safe-conduct) seek adjudication from us, or when one of them complains about another, the judge may either rule or decline. Allah the Exalted says, “If they come to you, then judge between them, or turn away from them” (1). Accordingly, he may decide for one party against the other if he wishes, and he may, at the request of one litigant, promise to summon the other (2) if he wishes, as mentioned earlier.

With two mustaʾmins, judgment is valid only with their joint consent; if either refuses, the judge does not rule, for they are not bound by our jurisdiction, unlike the dhimmis.

Whenever he does judge, he must do so in accordance with the law of Islam, for Allah says, “If you judge, judge between them with justice” (3).

Once a ruling has been issued against them, it becomes binding upon them because the contract obliges them to accept it. Our entire religious law, however, is not imposed on them: by accepting the jizya we have exempted them from making up prayers, paying zakat, performing the pilgrimage, and the like—though they will still be held accountable in the Hereafter for the universal foundations such as monotheism.