as having fallen under any ḥadith that threatens punishment; nor do I rebuke the curser with the severity due to one whom I judge to be liable to that threat. Rather, in my view, his cursing of the person who commits the disputed act is itself among the matters open to ijtihād. I do, however, regard him as mistaken in doing so, just as I may regard the one who deems the act permissible to be mistaken. On this issue three opinions exist:

1. The view that the act is permissible.
2. The view that it is forbidden and that the threat applies to it.
3. The view that it is forbidden, yet the severe threat does not pertain to it.

I personally adopt this third view: the evidence establishes the prohibition of the act and the prohibition of cursing the person who performs the disputed act, while I also hold that the ḥadith which conveys the warning to the doer and to the curser does not encompass these two cases.

Hence it may be said to the questioner: If you allow that cursing such a person can fall under the realm of ijtihād, then it is permissible to cite the explicit text as evidence for it; in that event, there is no guarantee that the point under dispute is not intended by the ḥadith of threat, and the factor that would include it is present, so acting upon it becomes obligatory. But if you do not allow it to be an issue of ijtihād, then cursing him is categorically forbidden.

There is no doubt that whoever curses a mujtahid with a curse that is categorically forbidden falls under the warning directed at the curser, even if he does so on the basis of (faulty) interpretation—just as would one who cursed any of the righteous predecessors.