Those independent jurists who held that the point under dispute does fall within the wording of the ḥadith accordingly deemed its doers subject to the stated threat.

Now, if the supposed difficulty remains in place whether we exclude the disputed case or leave it within the text, it is clear that no real difficulty exists, and nothing prevents us from citing the ḥadith as proof.
But if the difficulty is not established under either of the two assumptions, then no difficulty exists whatsoever.

Here is the reasoning: once the necessary concomitance is affirmed and it is understood that their inclusion on the assumption of existence entails their inclusion on the assumption of non-existence, one of two alternatives must hold. Either both the antecedent and its consequent are present—that is, they are all included—or both are absent—that is, they are all excluded; for whenever the antecedent exists the consequent exists, and whenever the consequent is absent the antecedent is likewise absent.

This much suffices to annul the objection. Nevertheless, what we maintain is that, in fact, they are not included under either assumption, as has already been shown. This is because falling under the threat is conditioned upon the absence of a legitimate excuse for the act, whereas anyone possessed of a Sharʿī excuse is never encompassed by the threat.

The mujtahid is excused—indeed, rewarded—so the condition for incurring the threat is absent in his case. Consequently, he is not included, whether he believes the ḥadith is to be taken at face value or that it is subject to a disagreement for which one may be excused. This is a decisive rebuttal.