for them; and omitting the proofs related to ambiguous matters would be better than laying them out.

Third: Setting forth the ruling together with the threat of punishment helps the one who already avoids the act remain steadfast in his avoidance; without that, the practice would spread.

Fourth: This excuse counts only when a person is genuinely unable to dispel it. Whenever someone is capable of learning the truth yet neglects to do so, he is not excused.

Fifth: It may happen that a person commits the act without engaging in an ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) that would permit it and without following a taqlid (reliance on another jurist) that would permit it. For such a person the cause for the threatened punishment exists, with no particular bar to remove it; he therefore exposes himself to the threat and it will reach him—unless another impediment arises, such as repentance, expiating good deeds, or something similar.

Moreover, the matter is fluid: one may imagine that his ijtihad or taqlid allows him to act, and at times he will be right in that assumption and at other times wrong. Yet so long as he earnestly seeks the truth and is not turned away from it by following whims, Allah burdens no soul beyond its capacity.

Tenth (1): If leaving these hadith to stand by their apparent meaning entails that some mujtahids fall under the threat, then removing them from their apparent meaning entails the very same thing—certain mujtahids will still fall under the threat.