Eighth: If we interpret the wording in this way, it already contains an explicit mention of the reason for the curse, and the one who is exempt is simply a person from whom the ruling is withheld because of a legitimate impediment. There is no doubt that someone who has been promised reward or threatened with punishment does not have to be explicitly excepted when that promise or threat fails to materialize for him on account of a conflicting factor; thus the statement proceeds along the path of correctness.

But if we restrict the curse to an act whose prohibition is unanimously agreed upon, or if we claim that the cause of the curse is holding a belief that contradicts consensus, then the cause of the curse is not actually stated in the ḥadīth, even though that broad wording would still need specification. Since some specification is unavoidable under either reading, adopting it according to the first view is preferable, because it conforms to the plain sense of the words and is free of any implied ellipsis.

Ninth: The entire motive behind this interpretation is simply to deny that the curse applies to one who has a valid excuse. We have already explained that the purpose of the ḥadīths of threat is to make clear that the act in question is a cause of that curse; the implied meaning, therefore, is: “This act is a cause of the curse.”

If it is said that this does not necessarily mean the ruling will be realized in every individual case, we answer that it does require recognition that the cause is present even when the ruling does not follow—and there is no objection to that.