the purport of the scriptural texts would then be contingent upon consensus, and that contradicts consensus itself. Consequently, the texts would lose all independent force: only consensus would matter, while the wording of revelation would exert no effect whatsoever.

If someone objects, “We may invoke a text so long as no disagreement is known,” the reply is that a single person’s dissent would be enough to annul the text’s import. This, too, runs counter to consensus, and its falsity is self-evident to every Muslim by the very necessities of the religion.

Fifth: Either the universality of the divine address is made conditional on the entire ummah’s believing the act to be forbidden, or it is deemed sufficient that the scholars hold that belief.

If the first view is adopted, one could never prove prohibition by the hadiths that carry threats of punishment until he knew that every individual in the ummah—even those raised in remote deserts and those who embraced Islam only yesterday—was convinced that the act is unlawful. No Muslim, indeed no rational person, would say this, for certifying such a condition is impossible.

If it is said instead that the agreement of all scholars suffices, we answer: you required scholarly consensus only to avoid having the threat apply to some mujtahids despite their error. Yet the very same predicament exists for laypeople who have never heard the evidence for prohibition, for the feared inclusion of the curse upon them is identical to the feared inclusion upon those scholars.