is excused in the matter; then for the person who actually performs the deed not to be subjected to the threat attached to that deed is even more appropriate and deserving.

Just as the mujtahid is not necessarily brought under the legal consequences of the prohibition—such as censure, punishment, and the like—so too is he not necessarily brought under its consequence of threat, for threat is simply one form of censure and punishment. If it is admissible that he fall under the larger category, then whatever reply suffices for some of its species suffices for the rest.

Drawing a distinction between little and much censure, or between severe and mild punishment, is of no benefit; for the objection that exists in the slightest degree of censure and punishment in this context is identical to that in its greatest degree. The mujtahid is touched by neither the lesser nor the greater; rather, he receives the very opposite—reward and recompense.

Second: Whether the ruling on an act is unanimously agreed upon or disputed is something external to the act itself and its qualities; it is only a relative matter arising from the lack of knowledge that confronted some scholars.

When a general wording is intended to mean something specific, evidence indicating that specification must be established—either accompanying the initial address, according to those who deem delaying clarification impermissible, or deferred until the time of need, according to the majority.

There is no doubt that those addressed in the lifetime of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) had to know the ruling conveyed by that address. Had the general wording concerning the curse of the consumer of riba (usury) and the muḥallil been intended